Failure to Join Both Property Owners Leads to Case Dismissal

Key Points:

• Pennsylvania Superior Court recently held that a plaintiff’s failure to join an indispensable party property co-owner was grounds for full dismissal of his premises liability claim.
• The case discussed the specifics of proprietary rights and ownership, as two brothers co-owned a property as tenants in common.
• Plaintiff only named one of the co-owner brothers as a defendant, despite being made aware of the joint ownership.
• The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, because the claim directly related to the ownership and alleged negligence related to that ownership, both of the owners/brothers were indispensable parties to the matter.
• Due to the fact that the statute of limitations had passed, the court dismissed the action.

A recent decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court underscores the importance of having a full understanding of the proprietary rights and ownership of a given property in premises liability suits. In Simone v. Alam, 303 A.3d 140 (Pa. Super. 2023), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff’s failure to join the co-owner of a property.

The lawsuit stemmed from a fall-down incident at a rental property which was owned and maintained by the defendant, Mohammed Zakiul Alam, and his brother, Mohammed Zafuil Alam. The incident occurred on January 16, 2018. The plaintiff filed her complaint on December 2, 2019, alleging the fall occurred due to an accumulation of ice beneath an outdoor staircase. The complaint named Mohammed Zakuil Alam as the only defendant, and not his brother/co-owner. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant owned, possessed, and controlled the property, such that he was responsible for the defective condition that led to her injuries.

The parties engaged in discovery, including responses to interrogatories and party depositions. Through the responses and the defendant’s deposition, it was made clear that the property was co-owned by the two Alam brothers as tenants in common. Despite this, the plaintiff never sought to amend her complaint.

Following the running of the applicable statute of limitations, on October 7, 2020, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to Join an Indispensable Party. The plaintiff argued that the co-owner’s absence should not impact the case, emphasizing that he had no possession or control over the multi-tenant rental property. However, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion, holding that the unnamed co-owner/brother was an indispensable party. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The question before the Superior Court was: Did the trial court err in dismissing her complaint for failure to join an indispensable party when the absent co-owner merely held a tenant-in-common interest without any possession or control over the property?

The plaintiff contended that the co-owners/brothers were merely tenants in common and that the co-owners’ interest would remain unaffected by a judgment against the unnamed defendant Alam. Additionally, she attempted to argue that there was no specific Pennsylvania case law deeming tenants in common as indispensable parties without exceptions. To support her position, she referenced case law from Washington, which provided that a premises liability action could proceed against the possessor of the premises, irrespective of the absence of the true owner.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed. The court began its opinion by giving an overview of the relevant proprietary rights involved. In discussing tenancy in common, the court noted that when individuals own property as tenants in common, they own and possess, in equal shares, an undivided interest in the whole property. Regarding those rights as it related to indispensability, the court stated that the legal concept of indispensability is defined by the connection between a party’s rights and the claims of the litigants. It further stated that the rule is not based on administrative convenience, but on the unity and identity of co-owners’ interests. The court discussed the case of Northern Forests II, Inc. v. Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 29 (Pa. Super. 2015), emphasizing that a party is indispensable when that party’s rights are so connected with the claims that no decree can be made without impairing those rights. The court further noted that Pa.R.C.P. 2227 explicitly states that persons with a joint interest must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. 

The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that there was no on-point Pennsylvania case law, referencing the case of Minner v. Pittsburgh, 69 A.2d 384 (Pa. 1949). In Minner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court mandated the joinder of all tenants in common in a negligence action arising from ownership of real estate. The Minner mandate was reinforced in the subsequent cases of Moorehead v. Lopatin, 445 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Super. 1982) and Enright v. Kirkendall, 819 A.2d 555 (Pa. Super. 2003). These decisions emphasized that when a party’s liability stems from ownership of real estate held by tenants in common, all co-owners are required to be joined.

The plaintiff’s case, akin to Minner, involved a liability claim arising directly from the unnamed defendant Alam’s ownership of the premises and allegations of negligence based upon that ownership. The Superior Court held that the fact that the Alam brothers were joint owners as tenants in common rendered the co-owner/brother an indispensable party. Based upon this, it affirmed the decision of the trial court, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.

*Brad is a shareholder in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 412.803.2448 or BEHaas@mdwcg.com.

_{Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.}