First District Court of Appeals finds compensability and no application of the “special hazard” exception or estoppel.

The claimant suffered an incomplete tetraplegia that resulted from a single-vehicle accident while riding home from work with a co-worker. After leaving the job site and driving for 45 minutes, the co-worker fainted due to dehydration. Both were leased employees through Labor Finders Incorporated (aka LFI) while working for LFI’s client company, Blue Goose.

Following the accident, the claimant brought a civil action against LFI and Blue Goose as co-defendants. Blue Goose asserted workers’ compensation immunity, claiming the “special hazard” exception to the “going and coming” rule applied, which would create compensability under the workers’ compensation statute. Blue Goose obtained summary judgment at the circuit court level, and the claimant dismissed them from the tort action with prejudice. LFI did not appear and were later voluntarily dismissed.

The claimant filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits, naming both LFI and Blue Goose as employers. It was undisputed that LFI was the proper employer. LFI then denied the claim, arguing there was no exception and, as such, was barred by the “going and coming” rule.

First, the Judge of Compensation Claims ruled that LFI was estopped from asserting the “going and coming” rule because Blue Goose had argued to the contrary in the civil action matter. The judge stated that LFI benefited from Blue Goose’s argument by being dismissed and that the two employers shared a special relationship. Second, the judge concluded that the “going and coming” rule did not apply because the co-worker’s dehydration was a “special hazard.” Third, relying on Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria, 383 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1980), the judge found that the dehydration experienced by the co-worker arose directly out of his employment.

LFI challenged the judge’s rationales. The First District Court of Appeal found that neither estoppel nor the “special hazard” doctrine applied because the claimant did not establish the required elements. Further, estoppel did not apply because the two employers had adverse interests in a workers’ compensation setting. Blue Goose would enjoy immunity as a special employer, while LFI had its own workers’ compensation coverage.

The court also found that Strother does not apply. Strother held that an injury might be compensable when an employer sets its cause in motion within the course and scope of the employment of the injured worker. Here, that may apply to the co-worker who suffered dehydration, but it did not extend to the claimant because it was not foreseeable. The court reasoned that the claimant’s decision to ride with the co-worker did not result in extending Stother and that the accident arose out of the course and scope of the workers’ employment.

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