Police Officers Have a Ministerial Duty to Render Assistance to an Intoxicated Person Involved in a Motor Vehicle Accident and Are Not Immune Under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act

Recently, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that police officers, who had an affirmative duty to render assistance in responding to a motor vehicle accident, were not immune under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. The lower court had granted summary judgment to the police officers, finding that their actions were discretionary in nature, were performed in good faith and were immune pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. In analyzing the Tort Claims Act, the Appellate Division reversed and held that the actions of the police officers were ministerial and not discretionary; therefore, the officers did not enjoy immunity under the act.

Hiram Gonzalez was involved in a motor vehicle accident to which Officers Leon Tucker and Saad Hashmi responded. When the tow truck arrived, Officer Tucker asked the tow truck driver if he would give Gonzalez a ride. The tow truck driver refused. Officer Tucker then asked Gonzalez if he wanted a ride to the nearby gas station. Gonzalez responded by saying, “I’m not riding with no Jersey City cops.” Gonzalez decided to wait for his brother at the scene of the accident.

The officers denied that they detected any signs that Gonzalez was under the influence of alcohol or illegal substances. However, deposition testimony revealed that Gonzalez had been drinking that day and that he was drunk. It also indicated that he was belligerent when he was drunk. David Martinez, a friend, testified that he was called by Gonzalez after the accident and spoke to an officer who said, “Listen, he’s been drinking a little bit . . . He can’t drive.” Martinez also believed that Gonzalez was drunk based on his past experiences with Gonzalez.

When Martinez arrived to pick up Gonzalez, Gonzalez was not at the scene of the accident. A little later, Eman Ahmed struck and killed Gonzalez. Ahmed testified that it had been drizzling and that, when she saw Gonzalez walking in the middle of the road, she applied her brakes and swerved in an attempt to avoid hitting him. Unfortunately, her vehicle struck and killed Gonzalez.

An autopsy revealed that Gonzalez had a blood alcohol level of .215. Expert testimony opined that Gonzalez’s blood alcohol level was .2 when he encountered the officers and that he would have been visibly intoxicated.

Officers Tucker and Hashmi argued that they were entitled to immunity because their actions or inactions involved discretionary conduct. They had used their judgment in handling a publicly intoxicated person pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-2 (exercise of judgment or discretion vested in him or her), N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 (good faith execution or enforcement of law) and N.J.S.A. 59:3-5 (failure to adopt or enforce any law). The plaintiff argued that the officers’ actions or inactions were ministerial functions and, therefore, the officers were not immune under to the Tort Claims Act, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-2(d).

The Appellate Division analyzed the meaning of discretionary and ministerial. A “discretionary act . . . calls for the exercise of personal deliberations and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” Estate of Hiram A. Gonzalez v. The City of Jersey City, et al., 2020 WL 1900491, at *5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. April 17, 2020) (citing S.P. v. Newark Pol. Dep’t, 52 A.3d 178, 190 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2012)). “In contrast, a ministerial act is ‘one which a person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.’”

Police officers have a duty to respond to an accident and render assistance. Citing Praet v. Sayreville, 527 A.2d 486, 488(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1987)). When police officers execute their duty, they “are as much liable for their negligence . . . as they would be for the negligent performance of any other administrative or ministerial duty imposed upon them by their employment.”

The Appellate Division found that the officers’ response to the motor vehicle accident was a ministerial duty and, therefore, triggered potential exposure if their actions or inactions were negligent. The court held that the case of Suarez v. Dosky, 407 A.2d 1237 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1979) was controlling. In Suarez, state troopers responded to an inoperable vehicle and refused to escort the family of that vehicle. The family began walking along the highway, and the mother and a young child were struck and killed. The court in Suarez found that the troopers were performing a ministerial duty in responding to the accident and were not immune pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. The court disagreed with the trial level and found that Morey v. Palmer, 556 A.2d 811 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1989) was not controlling given the facts. Estate of Gonzalez, 2020 WL 1900491, at *5-6.

Because the Appellate Division held that the officers were performing ministerial acts, N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 was not applicable and the officers did not enjoy immunity from suit. Additionally, because there was conflicting factual evidence as to Gonzalez’s behavior, summary judgment was reversed. The court found that it was a jury question as to whether the actions or inactions of the officers were negligent.

Police officers must be mindful when responding to any call from dispatch. Once they respond, their actions or inactions can be deemed ministerial and they will not enjoy the protections afforded by the Tort Claims Act pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-2 or 59:3-3.

*Matt is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey office. He can be reached at 856.414.6048 or mjbehr@mdwcg.com.

_{Defense Digest, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 2020 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2020 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.}