Immune or Not Immune? That Is the Question

In Grabowski v. Carelink Community Support Services, Inc., 230 A.3d 465 (Pa. Super. 2020), the plaintiff appealed an order of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granting the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the issue of whether the defendant was immune from tort liability as the plaintiff’s employer. The plaintiff, a residential counselor in an in-patient psychiatric facility, filed suit against her employer for personal injuries arising from an incident that occurred in her workplace when a resident attacked and sexually assaulted her. It was undisputed that the plaintiff was within the course and scope of her employment when the attack occurred.

In her negligence action filed against the defendant, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was liable for the attack because it did not have the appropriate safety procedures in place, did not provide the necessary equipment and did not have an adequate building design that was sufficient to protect the plaintiff from potentially violent residents. The defendant filed preliminary objections to the plaintiff’s complaint, asserting that it was immune from tort liability pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act and sought the  dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. The court denied the defendant’s preliminary objections without prejudice.

 Following the court’s denial of its preliminary objections, the defendant filed an answer with new matter, which asserted the facts regarding the plaintiff’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, the Compromise & Release Agreement and the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The plaintiff did not respond to the defendant’s new matter within 20 days.

The defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the Act and the workers’ compensation proceeding. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion, admitting receipt of workers’ compensation benefits and the C&R Agreement, but arguing that her claim against the defendant was not barred by the Act because it fell within the Act’s “personal animus” or “third party attack” exception. The plaintiff also filed a late response to the defendant’s new matter. The lower court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed that order.

The Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s order on different grounds than the lower court, holding that the workers’ compensation proceeding in which the plaintiff received benefits for the attack precluded her from arguing the “personal animus” or “third party attack” exception and barred her negligence action against the defendant as a matter of law. The court held that, where there is a final adjudication in a workers’ compensation proceedingthe injury is covered by the Act; where there is a workers’ compensation decision in which the employee is represented, the employee is estopped from claiming that the personal animus/third party attack exception applies. Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 472 (citing Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 615 A.2d 27, 30, 32 (Pa. 1992); Dunn v. United Insurance Co. of America, 482 A.2d 1055, 1057 (Pa. Super. 1984)). The court noted that the mere passive receipt of workers’ compensation benefits for an injury does not preclude an employee from suing her employer in negligence, but an adjudication or decision does. In this case, the plaintiff affirmatively sought and obtained additional benefits through the C&R Agreement based on her position that the attack was a work injury, and the C&R Agreement was approved in a workers’ compensation adjudication.

Although the Superior Court’s holding was based on judicial estoppel principles, the court also held that the plaintiff’s arguments failed on the merits. The court deemed that a person asserting the personal animus/third party attack exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act must show that there was not only an intentional attack, but that the victim was attacked for purely personal reasons that were not related to the victim’s employment. Because the plaintiff’s complaint alleged she was attacked suddenly and for unknown reasons, not personal reasons, the court found that the personal animus/third party attack exception did not apply. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that sexual attacks, by their very nature, cannot be considered work-related.

*Claire is a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office who can be reached at 215.575.2789 or cbventola@mdwcg.com.

_{Defense Digest, Vol. 26, No. 3, October 2020 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2020 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.}